| Article Title En | The Distinction between a ‘Mental State’ and ‘Our Belief about It’ in the Thought of Armstrong and Shoemaker |
|---|---|
| Authors | سیدمصطفی حسینی، محمود صوفیانی و محمد اصغری، |
| Journal | پژوهش های فلسفی دانشگاه تبریز |
| Publication Name En | Journal of Philosophical Investigations |
| Dor Code | 2025.65889.4003 |
| Presented by | تبریز |
| Page number | ۱۶۱ |
| Page Number To | 178 |
| Volume number | ۵۲ |
| Paper Type | Full Paper |
| Published At | ۲۰۲۵/۱۱/۱۱ |
| Journal Grade | Scientific - research |
| Journal Type | Electronic |
| Journal Country | Iran, Islamic Republic Of |
Abstract
Introspection is a method of accessing the contents of the mind. The nature of this access can be categorized into two main perspectives: the first group relates to explanations that consider introspection to be similar to perception, with the difference that the direction of the gaze is inward, not outward. For this reason, they are also known as “inner sense” explanations. The second group are explanations that consider introspection to be a kind of direct acquaintance and understanding of mental states. Believers in the second group, unlike the first group, rule out the possibility of error in introspection. David Armstrong belongs to the first group and Sidney Shoemaker to the second. Although Armstrong's claim is not without its flaws and sometimes even contradicts common intuition, it seems that the challenges facing Shoemaker are much deeper. The most important challenge for him is that his arguments - even assuming apparent clarity and solidity - are ultimately based on first-person testimony rather than objective facts, and therefore are much more difficult, if not impossible, to prove. Our goal in this article is to formulate the opposition between these two ideas in an analytical-critical manner and to criticize them as much as possible, and to show that the problem of introspection cannot be solved in the realm of the mind.
tags: inner sense